Full Account
How the attack worked, step by step — the vulnerability, the exploit, and the $80M that disappeared.
Qubit Finance ran a cross-chain bridge (QBridge) between Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain. On January 28, 2022, an attacker found that calling deposit() instead of depositETH() triggered the same on-chain event — but required zero actual ETH. The bridge relayer, watching only events, minted qXETH tokens on BSC for free. The attacker used these as collateral to drain $80 million.
Three things made this possible: the bridge was deployed without a completed security audit, a contract parameter was secretly changed by the owner days before (no timelock, no announcement), and a known EVM behavior — that calling any function on the zero address silently succeeds — was never accounted for.
Full Account
How the attack worked, step by step — the vulnerability, the exploit, and the $80M that disappeared.
Technical Analysis
The deposit() vs depositETH() event collision. The zero-address EOA trick. The suspicious parameter change.
Timeline
From the January 28 exploit to four years of silence — a complete chronological record.
Nine Unanswered Questions
Why did the team ignore people with hacker information? Why was unaudited code deployed? Why was the CTO’s LinkedIn deleted?
Team Response
The moderator who removed victims. The CTO who vanished from LinkedIn. The Binance security team that was never called.
Follow the Money
The hacker’s wallet. The $20M silent victim connected to Binance Hot Wallet. Four years of zero movement toward recovery.
Qubit Finance was built by Mound Inc., registered in Daejeon, South Korea (Registration: 160111-0556766). The company is 90.5% owned by Krypton PTE. LTD. (Singapore), which is 60% owned by CEO Jun Hur. Mound Inc. had already lost ~$45M in the May 2021 PancakeBunny hack. They built Qubit Finance to recover — then lost $80M more.
Full corporate structure, addresses, and shareholder filings →
Etherscan (ETH) · BSCScan (BSC) · Full money flow analysis →
One wallet lost 8,510.12 ETH (~$20M USD at the time) — one quarter of the entire hack. All transfers ran through the Binance Hot Wallet. This person has never said a word publicly.
Qubit Finance was a Binance Smart Chain project with explicit Binance endorsement. When victims appealed directly to CZ and Binance to intervene — to blacklist the attacker’s wallet, to pressure Mound Inc., to use their platform influence — they were ignored.
“Hi Sir, on same BSC, why you protected Squid Game, but did nothing with Bunny this time? This is not fair play.” — Victim appeal to @cz_binance, 2022
Read the victim appeals to Binance →
Report Information
Have information about the hacker, fund movements, or Mound Inc.’s internal decisions? Submit it — confidentially if needed.
Victims Community
Connect with other victims. The Qubit Victims Alliance has been fighting for accountability since 2022.
Media Coverage
Bloomberg, CoinDesk, The Verge, ZDNet, The Register and more covered this story. It isn’t over.
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